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Abstract 
 
Webmail is a convenient way of accessing emails via a web browser on any 
computer connected to the Internet and it has gained popularity amongst Internet 
users. Many webmail service providers offer a free email service where users can 
set up an email account online by supplying their personal details and choosing a 
preferred username.  
 
Email artefacts such as usernames, aliases, message subject and body may be 
useful in a digital investigation and thus require recovery and analysis. Unlike 
client based email software where a user’s messages are stored locally on the hard 
disk, webmail messages are stored remotely on the webmail provider’s servers, 
potentially making it difficult for digital investigators to obtain relevant artefacts. 
However, since webmail is accessed through a browser and browsers leave their 
own artefacts, it may be possible to recover artefacts that may be useful in 
investigations.  
 
This paper discusses certain artefacts that can be left on a user’s hard disk as a 
result of using Hotmail. For instance, artefacts that could be used to infer when an 
email account was created and the details supplied at set up; details of exchanged 
emails such as who a user sent an email to, when the email was sent and whether it 
was replied to; full or partial contents of the email; details of contacts that had been 
added, edited, deleted or restored by the account user. 
 
The experiments are carried out on Hotmail using Firefox 9 and involve the 
analysis of the various file formats used by Firefox as well as their evidential 
value. The research also involves a multi-tool analysis technique which is 
necessary due to the differences in the format of artefacts recovered and to ensure 
the accurate interpretation of data. A hex editor, SQLite analysis tool, standalone 
JSON viewer, and a cache analysis tool are some of the tools identified as useful 
and are discussed in this paper. 
1.0 Introduction 
Webmail has gained popularity amongst users as a convenient way of accessing 
emails through a web browser on any computer connected to the Internet [1]. A 
range of service providers (e.g. Yahoo, Lycos and Gmail) offer free webmail to 
users.  
 
The identification and analysis of webmail artefacts is useful in digital 
investigations because evidence of criminal activity (e.g. the Anderson-Enron case 
[2]), or innocence of an individual [3] could be found in such artefacts. The 
forensic analysis of webmail artefacts has been described as a challenge for 
investigators because messages are stored remotely by the service provider thereby 
making it less accessible to digital investigators [1], [4]. However, as webmail is 
accessed through a web browser, and browsers leave their own artefacts, some 
webmail artefacts may be recoverable.  
 
This paper discusses the types and evidential value of artefacts that may be 
recovered from a user’s hard disk as a result of Hotmail use. This paper makes the 
following contributions: it identifies the artefacts that exist as a result of Hotmail 
use in Firefox 9; it documents the artefacts and discusses their volatility. It also 
shows the possibility of making inferences about user actions and establishing a 
timeframe for the observed actions. 
 
2.0 Background 
2.1 Overview 
 
This section provides a background to Email analysis and Hotmail, briefly 
discussing related research.  
2.2 Existing work on Email analysis 
Email has been described as “one of the most important vehicles for criminal 
activity” [5] and artefacts from emails have also been recognised as important and 
often crucial to digital investigations as they can contain a wealth of information 
that can advance a case [6]. Email architecture and the forensic analysis of client 
and web based email artefacts has been researched by [7–9] amongst others.  
 
Jones et al. [10] researched the reconstruction of client based email activity and 
analysed the different formats used to store the emails. This was achieved using 
commercial and open source tools and the conclusion was that the recovery and 
analysis of such artefacts is possible however, some storage formats may not be 
recognised by certain tools.  
 
Al-Zarouni [11] discussed the issues associated with tracing header information in 
emails i.e. determining message source and destination by detecting fake email 
addresses and whether a message was sent via a browser or client software. 
Webmail was identified as harder to trace for a number of reasons including a 
user’s ability to provide false details when creating an account [7]. Al-Zarouni [11] 
came to the conclusion that email investigations are complex and in a similar view 
to [8] suggests techniques such as server side investigation as means of 
determining the source of a message. Although some focus has been from a client 
based email perspective [7], [12], a number of researchers have shown interest in 
webmail [13–15].  
 
One example of a webmail service is Hotmail which is from Microsoft. It is one of 
the popular webmail services and has several features such as contact listing, 
emailing, instant messaging, and managing user profile as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1–An Illustration of Hotmail home page showing links to the main features. 
Webmail has been identified as a relevant aspect of digital investigations and at the 
same time a challenge to investigators in terms of availability and recovery of 
artefacts. Eleutério [16] carried out experiments to determine the relationship 
between web browsers and the webmail artefacts that can be recovered from a 
user’s hard disk and concluded that it is dependent on the browser type and chosen 
webmail service provider. Eleutério [16] provided tabulated summaries of methods 
and the type of artefacts recovered from different web browsers including Firefox 
but did not provide full details of location and format of artefacts investigators 
need to look out for e.g. JSON or SQLite format artefacts.  
 
2.5 Summary 
This section has shown various approaches taken by researchers investigating 
email evidence and its relevance to digital investigations. The related work shows 
that there has been more research into client based email. This highlights the need 
for more research into webmail artefacts as factors like browser version updates or 
webmail service provider updates could affect the way in which webmail artefacts 
are left on disk.  
 
3.0 Methodology 
3.1 Aim and Scope 
As discussed in the previous section, there is limited publication on specific 
artefacts left by Hotmail. Because artefacts are browser based, to report specifics, 
focus needs to be on a particular browser. This paper is focused on Hotmail 
artefacts generated in Firefox 9 web browser on Windows 7. 
 
3.2 Overall methodology 
The research method used for this paper was experimental. The experiments 
conducted involved the generation of data i.e. creation of user email accounts, 
sending and receiving emails, adding, editing and deleting contacts. Experiments 
also involved logging all actions performed and an analysis of the disk images.  
 
3.3 Experimental methodology 
3.3.1 Data Generation 
Two sets of virtual machines (VMs) were created for hypotheses formulation and 
validation. Windows 7 and Firefox 9 were installed and Hotmail accounts were 
created on each VM for 4 test users. 
 
Emails were exchanged between the users and the URLs and message content were 
recorded prior to sending a message to recipients using the To, CC and BCC. The 
second part of the exchange involved reading, replying, deleting messages and 
viewing the deleted messages in the trash folder. In addition to the message content 
and URL being recorded: actions such as switching on the VM, launching the 
browser, user login to email account, email addresses, usernames/aliases, date and 
time of exchange, message subject and the disk image were also noted. Contacts 
were added to the user’s address book when prompted. An existing contact was 
viewed, edited, deleted and restored.  
 
3.3.2 Data Analysis 
For each step described in Section 3.3.1, the analysis involved a keyword search of 
disk, analysing the SQLite databases, Firefox cache analysis, and analysing 
JSON/.js files as discussed below: 
 
 Keyword search: 
Selected keywords recorded at the experimental stage (email addresses, 
usernames/aliases, etc.) were searched for across the disk image using X-
Ways Forensics. Keyword search returned results from live and deleted 
files and provided an insight as to other parts of the disk e.g. unallocated 
space, where artefacts are located. There are limitations associated with 
keyword searching for instance, data not stored as plain ASCII or Unicode 
on disk (e.g. compressed files in the Firefox cache) were not found. 
  SQLite databases: 
SQLite databases in the Firefox profile folder were analysed for Hotmail 
artefacts using sqlite3Explorer (from: http://www.singular.gr/sqlite/). The 
complexity of the SQLite file format means that raw data from the 
keyword search alone does not provide easy to interpret structured results. 
Analysing the databases separately provides a more structured 
interpretation of the data e.g. human readable dates and times. Queries 
were constructed based on the information logged during the experiments, 
to help filter the records and the following databases were searched: 
places.sqlite and formhistory.sqlite. 
 
 
Places.sqlite is used by Firefox to store information such as browsing 
history, downloads and bookmarks. Places.sqlite is located by default in 
the user’s Firefox profile in Windows 7: \Users\username\App 
Data\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\###.default (where ### is a 
string of alphanumeric characters). Places.sqlite contains a number of 
tables however, the moz_places and moz_historyvisits tables are of 
particular interest as they contain visited URLs with dates and times of 
visit [17], and session ID which makes it possible to group actions that 
occurred within the same session [18].  
 
Formhistory.sqlite holds a set of name/value pairs and manages the 
autocomplete service in Firefox [19]. It stores all text entries made in 
forms on web pages with the exception of password  fields [20], including 
the date and time the entry was first used and last used. Formhistory.sqlite 
is located in the user’s Firefox profile in Windows 7: 
\Users\username\App 
Data\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\###.default and it contains the 
moz_formhistory table which stores this information so that the values 
and field names held correspond to specific fields they were submitted to. 
Thus when a web page is revisited, the user is shown options of 
previously entered values e.g. when completing the ‘To, CC or BCC’ 
fields on an email compose page. In some cases, several entries may exist 
for a field such as username but with different values [19]. 
Formhistory.sqlite was analysed for artefacts relating to form entries such 
as user login, adding contacts to address books, and entering email 
addresses in the recipient fields of a compose page. 
 
 sessionstore.js: 
Sessionstore.js stores a user’s browser session data including any open 
windows and tabs, page views (minimised, maximised), form data, 
session cookies, closed tabs/windows, start and “last update” times. 
Sessionstore.js is located in the user profile folder \Users\username\App 
Data\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\###.default and enables session 
restoration in the event of an unexpected browser shutdown e.g. crashes, 
browser or add-on installation and updates [21]. When a session is 
restored, the windows and tabs are placed in their original position i.e. 
specific scroll positions the user has on each page will be displayed. 
However, if the browser is shutdown properly, Firefox deletes the 
sessionstore.js file and a new file is created for the new session. Firefox 
also maintains a sessionstore.bak file as a backup for browser sessions 
[21]. This is a renamed sessionstore.js file and is also in JSON format 
with name/value pairs in an array [22]. An excerpt is shown below: 
 
 
 
It is important to note that it is possible to recover complete or fragmented 
sessionstore.js files by initiating a search across a hard disk using 
{"windows":[{"tabs":[{"entries":[{"url": as a header and "startTime": as  
an approximation of the footer allowing the data to be extracted from a 
disk image.  
 
Sessionstore.js was analysed using multiple tools. The fragments were 
extracted using X-Ways and analysed using JsonViewer (a standalone 
JSON Viewer available from http://jsonviewer.codeplex.com/). The aim 
was to facilitate the deconstruction and interpretation of what the different 
values mean. In addition to the manual extraction and examination of 
sessionstore.js artefacts, Internet Evidence Finder (IEF4 v4) was used to 
validate the results. However, this only provided the URLs and did not 
give a detailed view of additional elements such as form data and session 
cookies, unlike JsonViewer and X-Ways.  
 
 Cache: 
In order to enhance efficiency, Firefox uses the cache to temporarily store 
objects from websites visited by a user. This allows the browser to fetch 
such items locally when the website is revisited rather than re-
downloading these resources [5]. However, if the cached object is out of 
date, the browser downloads it again.  
 
In Windows 7, the Firefox cache is located in \Users\username\App 
Data\Local\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\###.default\Cache. Exploring the 
Cache folder shows that it contains four files: a _CACHE_MAP_ file 
(index for cache data and metadata); three cache block files: 
_CACHE_001_, _CACHE_002_, _CACHE_003_; sixteen subdirectories 
(named 0-9, A-F) which contain other subdirectories that are used to store 
objects that are larger than the three cache block files [23–25]. It is 
important to note that some cached objects are gzipped (the web server 
can send compressed resources to the browser). Analysing the Firefox 
cache was achieved using Digital Detective’s HstEx v3.8 and NetAnalysis 
v1.54 was used for reconstructing the cached data.  
 
 Additional files: 
Besides the above mentioned files, artefacts may also be found in 
unallocated space and in some system files e.g. pagefile.sys and volume 
shadow copies. This is often as a result of files being cleared or deleted by 
an application (such as Firefox) but are still resident on disk until they are 
overwritten. For example the use of SQLite Write Ahead Logs (WAL) 
[26],[27]. Search hits returned from unallocated space or system files 
(pagefile.sys etc.) were extracted and analysed using relevant tools e.g. 
sqlite3Explorer, JsonViewer. 
 
4.0 Results and Discussion 
4.1 Overview 
Artefacts of interest in this research include those generated as a result of account 
creation, sending, receiving and deleting messages, and managing contacts in a 
user’s address book. This section discusses the experimental results for each of 
these. 
4.2 Account creation 
As described in Section 3.3, email accounts were created for users on VMs with 
Windows 7 and Firefox 9 installed. Following on from a keyword search of the 
VM disk images; a number of artefacts were identified that indicate the creation of 
a Hotmail account.  
4.2.1 Account ‘sign up’ results 
Locating email account creation artefacts involved searching for the recorded email 
addresses/aliases, user passwords and answers to the security questions. These 
keywords returned several hits which were further analysed to determine their 
relevance to this paper. Artefacts were identified in places.sqlite and 
sessionstore.js. The URL identified for account creation in this case is 
https://signup.live.com/signup.aspx?wreply=http:%2F%2Fmail.live.com&id=6485
5&mkt=en-
GB&form=WWLMCNA&publ=SIGNINHM&crea=HTML_CIMS017788_Window
s+%2b+WL_EN-GB_0X0_134324&lic=1# as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Account creation in moz_places filtered by data, time and session ID 
More experiments were conducted and a common base URL: 
https://signup.live.com/signup.aspx was identified. To recover additional data, the 
results in moz_places and moz_historyvisits were sorted by date and time where 
the URL includes “signup.live.com”. Using the places.sqlite specification [18], the 
filtered results were grouped by session ID which can be used to determine the last 
time and date a particular page was visited, thus increasing the chances of 
identifying visits from the same session. The results from places.sqlite did not 
provide the details of the user who had signed up thus a keyword search was 
carried out on disk for “signup.live.com” and hits were returned in sessionstore.js. 
 
The start and end time within the recovered sessionstore.js file in Figure 3 provided 
a time frame in UNIX millisecond value, for the session during which the Hotmail 
account was created. The time was interpreted using DCode to obtain the annotated 
values and was compared to the dates and times in places.sqlite in order to 
establish a timeline.  
 
The artefacts recovered from sessionstore.js were in JSON file format in a deleted 
copy of sessionstore.js, in unallocated space and was analysed using JsonViewer to 
make the information more presentable and manageable. This made it possible to 
view the individual elements of the file and extract additional session information 
such as formdata which provided information regarding how and when an account 
was created as seen in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Screenshot of account set up info when viewed in JsonViewer. As can be seen, 
the user’s sign up details are available in plain text. 
As the artefact format (JSON) has been determined and is plain text, it was 
determined that an automated search across the disk using the known fields which 
are unique to Hotmail such as #imembernamelive, iBirthYear etc., will determine if 
any fragments are on disk (a keyword search using #iSQ and #iSA returned false 
positives). The sessionstore.js file also contained 26 cookies set for “live.com” 
hosts which on examination appear to be session cookies as there was no record of 
cookies set for hosts like “signup.live.com” within cookies.sqlite. 
 
While account creation artefacts can be useful, it is important to know that they 
may not always be available as they may be overwritten with time. More research 
is required to determine the factors that can affect the length of time this sort of 
artefact is available before it is overwritten. In addition to availability, the details 
supplied at account set up may be fictitious and thus unreliable. 
 
 
4.2.1 Account ‘sign up’ results 
In addition to recovering artefacts from account creation, places.sqlite was 
analysed for account access artefacts and the login URL was identified as 
https://login.live.com/login.srf?wa=wsignin1.0&rpsnv=11&ct=1329068205&rver
=6.1.6206.0&wp=MBI&wreply=http:%2F%2Fmail.live.com%2Fdefault.aspx&lc
=2057&id=64855&mkt=en-gb&cbcxt=mai&snsc=1, prompting a keyword search 
for “login.live.com” results were returned from fragments of sessionstore.js with 
no session time details. It is important to note that login details can be written to 
formhistory.sqlite as discussed in Section 3.3.2 and an analysis of formhistory 
provided the user email address which was used see Figure 4. The places.sqlite 
URL was compared with the formhistory.sqlite entry and a timeline was 
determined (although the formhistory entry was slightly after the places entry). 
 
 
 
Figure 4 - Snapshot of user login details from formhistory.sqlite 
 
4.3 Mailbox management 
This section discusses the results from composing, sending, reading and deleting 
messages. 
4.3.1 Composing messages 
A keyword search was carried out using the usernames, subject and content of the 
emails recorded during the experiment. Several artefacts were found in different 
areas on disk and in different file formats (SQLite, JSON, and HTML). Fragments 
of the URLs recorded when composing messages during the experiment were 
searched for on disk and hits were returned as seen in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Fragment of data consistent with moz_places showing message compose URL 
 
An analysis of places.sqlite returned /HipLight.aspx?HipOp=Compose as one of 
the URLs associated with sending messages from a Hotmail account. Account 
verification is required by Hotmail when a message is sent from an email account 
for the first time thus the URL fragment /HipLight.aspx?HipOp=Compose is 
indicative of a recently created and unverified account.  
 
Hotmail automatically redirects the user to a verification page before a message is 
sent. Once the account is verified, a /HipSuccess.aspx URL is seen in the address 
bar and the user is prompted to send the message. See Figure 5 for screenshots of 
user Hotmail account prior to and after verification. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 - Account verification request. 
 
Places.sqlite returned both URLs and a third which is consistent with verified 
accounts. When an account has been used to send several emails, there is a change 
in the format of the URL. An /InboxLight.aspx?n= format is seen. This is followed 
by a string of numbers that changes depending on the action carried out by the user 
e.g.: 
  
 
 
Compose new message: 
 
Reply an email: 
 
Figure 7 - Changes in URL format depending on past user behaviour. 
 
The page title showing the user email address was available from places.sqlite but 
actual content of the compose page was not found. Searching sessionstore.js 
produced other results that were compared to places.sqlite.  
 
4.3.2 Sending, replying and deleting messages 
Messages were read, replied, and deleted. Filters were created in places.sqlite to 
return URLs containing terms such as “SendMessage, EditMessage, ReadMessage, 
fid=” which had been recorded previously and this returned results and were sorted 
by date and time. It was observed that when messages are replied, the sender’s 
email address was embedded in the URL. Two formats were observed and the 
second appears to be a condensed version of the first as seen in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 - Recovered URL formats for replied messages (bold highlighting added for 
emphasis). Note the %40 substituted for the @ symbol. 
 
Searching for the subject, content of exchanged messages and additional terms 
“SenderEmail, cmid=, csem=” across disk and returned results in sessionstore.js, 
formhistory.sqlite, and pagefile.sys. A HTML fragment was returned from 
Format 1: 
/P.mvc#!/mail/EditMessageLight.aspx?Action=Reply&AllowUnsafe=True&ReadMess
ageId=9e4590ef-c9c0-11e1-97ce-001e0bcc1a3a&FolderID=00000000-0000-0000-
0000-
000000000001&Aux=2150%7C0%7C8CF2BE488C9E580%7C%7C0%7C1%7C0%7C
0%7C6%7C3%2C11&SenderEmail=test-user01%40hotmail.co.uk&n=578919616  
 
Format 2: 
/P.mvc#!/mail/InboxLight.aspx?n=193555677&view=1&cmid=9e4590ef-c9c0-11e1-
97ce-001e0bcc1a3a&csem=test-
user01%40hotmail.co.uk&cdid=&cfid=1&cau=1&cmad=2154%7C0%7C8CF2BE489
35C6B0%7C%7C0%7C1%7C0%7C0%7C6%7C3%2C11&cacc=1 
pagefile.sys on test user2’s disk and contained the reply of a message. As seen in 
Figure 6, the fragment provided information such as date and time, origin, 
destination, message content. It also highlights other search terms e.g. 
fOriginalMessageId, fSubject, fMessageBody. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 – Message fragment recovered from pagefile.sys (highlighted in bold for emphasis)  
-----------------------------41184676334 
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="ToolbarActionItem" SendMessage 
-----------------------------41184676334 
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="fOriginalMessageId" 
e3f8c7d3-55a2-11e1-9b27-001e0bccddde 
 
-----------------------------41184676334 
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="fMsgSentState"1 
-----------------------------41184676334 
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="fFrom"testuser02@hotmail.co.uk 
 
-----------------------------41184676334 
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="cpselectedAutoCompleteTo" 
[;;test-user01%26%2364%3Bhotmail.co.uk;false;false;0] 
 
-----------------------------41184676334 
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="fTo""" <test-user01@hotmail.co.uk>; 
-----------------------------41184676334 
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="cpselectedAutoCompleteCc" 
 
-----------------------------41184676334 
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="fCc" 
 
-----------------------------41184676334 
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="cpselectedAutoCompleteBcc" 
 
-----------------------------41184676334 
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="fBcc" 
 
-----------------------------41184676334 
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="fSubject" RE: first test email 
 
-----------------------------41184676334 
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="fMessageBody" 
 
<br>This is my own test message<br> 
From: test-user01@hotmail.co.uk<br> 
To: testuser02@hotmail.co.uk<br> 
Subject: first test email<br> 
Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2012 17:56:33 +0000<br><br> 
 
</style> 
<div dir="ltr"> 
This is a test message. <br>     </div></div> 
A sent message fragment was also recovered from sessionstore.js on test user3’s 
hard disk (see Figure 10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 – Fragment recovered from sessionstore.js (line breaks inserted) showing message 
content. 
 
Artefacts recovered from sessionstore.js and formhistory.sqlite contained the 
names email addresses of user contacts and corresponds with addition after a 
message was sent to recipients for the first time (an excerpt is shown below). This 
is discussed further in Section 4.4. In order to infer user behaviour, artefacts from 
places.sqlite, sessionstore.js, pagefile.sys and formhistory.sqlite were combined. 
 
Using NetAnalysis, the Cache was examined for Hotmail artefacts. The search 
returned several CSS, HTML, wyciwyg (what you cache is what you get) entries 
[28] but no message content. To understand the absence of cached messages, 
Firefox 9 was launched and used to access Hotmail while monitoring the cache. It 
was observed that Firefox 9 uses three types of cache (memory, disk and offline 
cache) to manage user browsing activity.  
 
While logged into the user Hotmail account, the HTTP response headers in the 
memory cache were captured, examined and seen to contain Cache-Control: no-
cache’ in the header (see Figure 12). It was determined that Hotmail resources have 
‘no-cache’, no-store, must-revalidate in the response header i.e. the server instructs 
the browser not to cache the page content locally [15]. When the browser was shut 
down and restarted, the memory cache was flushed however, the no-cache content 
was not written to the disk cache. It is possible however for such artefacts to be 
resident in sessionstore.js or pagefile.sys (as discussed earlier). 
 
 
 
Figure 11 - Snippet of Hotmail response header in memory cache. 
{"url":"http://gfx3.hotmail.com/mail/16.2.7030.0523/ts0a.js", 
"ID":109,"docshellID":101, 
"referrer":"http://sn139w.snt139.mail.live.com/handlers/resourcespreload.mvc
?bicild=&view=Hotmail.Compose", 
"docIdentifier":109,"scroll":"0,0"}], 
"scroll":"0,0"}], 
"formdata":{"#isFirstPL":"","//xhtml:div[@id='RichTextEditor']/xhtml:div/xht
ml:textarea[@name='fMessageBody']":"\nThis is three lines of a test 
message.<br><br>3f65bb87b7a8aaea0ad529cb7c85717c<br><br>22b597f64a
2484189f4e3b9a3e0bc73a<br><br><br>"} 
 Messages were deleted and viewed in the Hotmail trash folder during the 
experiment and artefacts found in live and deleted copies of sessionstore.js; live 
places.sqlite (and deleted places.sqlite-wal) contained the URL (with the message 
id) of the deleted message. Establishing whether a recovered URL indicates a sent, 
deleted or draft message was achieved by repeated visits to the different folders 
and recording the changes to the value after the folder ID (“fid=”) where 1=inbox, 
2=deleted, 3=sent, 4=draft, 5=junk. Recovering the URL of a message alone may 
not be useful if the messageId is unknown to the investigator but may require 
identifying the message folder and contacting the service provider in order to 
retrieve the contents from the server. A search of the cache using NetAnalysis did 
not return any relevant results. 
 
4.4 Contact management 
This section discusses the results from adding, editing, deleting and restoring 
contacts in a user’s address book within Hotmail. 
 
4.4.1 Adding contacts 
Contacts were added to the user address book after a prompt by Hotmail after a 
message was sent. The fragment seen in Figure 12 is from sessionstore.js and 
shows formdata containing the names entered by the user. 
 
 
Figure 12 - Sessionstore.js fragment with contact names as formdata values. 
 
 
 
 
4.4.1 Editing, deleting and restoring contacts 
When a message is sent to recipients, the email address only is written to 
formhistory.sqlite however, when a user is prompted to add a contact to the address 
book, more information can be stored e.g. names, nicknames. As seen in Figure 13, 
the first entry in the To, Cc and Bcc fields are email addresses while the second has 
first and last names associated with it.  
 
 
Figure 13  - Contacts added to user address book as seen in formhistory.sqlite 
The fieldname column in formhistory.sqlite shows where the entries in the value 
column were made. The entries in the table include the user email address used to 
login to the email account, names and email addresses of recipients. In the 
fieldname column, when more than one recipient was added to the ‘To, Cc or Bcc’ 
fields, they were indexed by appending numbers 0–n (n = maximum number of 
entries in each field). The ‘firstUsed’ date is when the entry was first made while 
‘lastUsed’ is the most recent use date. These dates and times correspond with the 
time logged during the experiments. 
 
For contact editing and deletion, keywords searched for in places.sqlite were: 
“contact, profile, cid=, edit, delete, and restore”. URLs recovered from 
places.sqlite contained a ‘ContactId’ which is a string of hexadecimal characters 
assigned to a contact once it has been added to a Hotmail account. Places.sqlite 
also contained the page title e.g. test user2’s details, Edit details” as seen in Figure 
14. 
 
 
 
Figure 14 - Date and time correlation of modified contact in places.sqlite 
 
For restored contacts, the ‘ContactId’ was present with the page title. However, 
this information may be unreliable as the ContactId changes when a contact is 
deleted and restored. However, after sorting the results by date and time, it was 
possible to match the entries in formhistory to the URLs, page titles, date and time 
in places.sqlite and these were used to deduce which contacts had been edited or 
restored (the formhistory entry was slightly ahead of the places entry). 
 
 
4.5 Summary 
This section has shown that artefacts relating to Hotmail activity in Firefox 9 can 
be recovered from a user’s hard disk. Artefacts indicating account setup were 
recovered from pagefile.sys and sessionstore.js and were identified as volatile as 
they degrade with time. This section has shown that sessionstore.js is a very useful 
file as it contains a wealth of information (e.g. URLs, formdata, date and time) that 
can be extracted and compared or combined with other artefacts on disk and used 
to reconstruct an event or infer user behaviour. This section has also shown that 
keyword searching a disk is necessary as it can help capture fragmented artefacts 
which may not be recoverable by tools which search for artefacts using file 
signatures. Finally, this section has presented key terms that can be useful when 
searching for Hotmail artefacts on disk. 
5.0 Evaluation 
This paper analysed artefacts resident on a hard disk as a result of Hotmail use in 
Firefox 9 on Windows 7. Other web browsers, webmail service providers and 
operating systems can be used to conduct similar experiments and are likely to 
produce varying results as demonstrated by [16].  Due to the rapid version updates, 
this paper did not cover artefacts that can be recovered from other versions of 
Firefox (v 10+). In addition, other system files and locations e.g. hyberfil.sys, and 
the Windows Registry were not examined as a detailed study of their interactions 
with the web browser is yet to be undertaken but these files may contain artefacts. 
 
Artefacts created as a result of user behaviour such as creating and verifying a 
Hotmail account, managing messages and contacts were analysed. In particular the 
volatility of artefacts from account creation was identified however, the length of 
time it lasts or the factors affecting its availability were not established and would 
require further work. Artefacts relating to email exchange and contact management 
were examined however an in-depth deconstruction of parts of the URL e.g. 
messageId and ContactId was not carried out due to unavailability of specifications 
or naming conventions from Hotmail. Although this paper has shown the 
possibility of recovering Hotmail artefacts, there is currently insufficient 
information that can be used to develop a dedicated tool for Hotmail analysis.   
 
Other activities such as using the integrated instant messenger or the document 
storage and file sharing feature (SkyDrive) within Hotmail have not been explored 
as it is out of the scope of this paper however, the methodology described in this 
paper can be applied to these. Finally, the use of multiple tools was necessitated by 
the difference in the file formats used by Firefox 9 and also to enable the reliable 
interpretation of recovered artefacts.  
 
6.0 Conclusions & Future Work 
This paper presented the results obtained from analysing Hotmail artefacts in 
Firefox 9. It can be seen that although the recovery of webmail artefacts has been 
described as a challenge for investigators, it is possible to recover artefacts that can 
be used to infer user behaviour by exploiting the data left by a browser. Several 
methods of recovering these artefacts such as keyword searching, analysing SQLite 
databases and analysing live and deleted sessionstore.js were discussed.  
 
This paper identified artefacts of interest related to Hotmail use and discussed 
methods of recovering and interpreting these artefacts. It has shown that although 
these artefacts can be written to disk in various ways, timing of recovery is 
important as they may be overwritten. This paper has shown the possibility of 
automating the search for artefacts by incorporating the identified key terms 
identified in the artefacts into scripts in order to scan disks for fragments of 
artefacts. This is particularly useful in cases where they have been partially 
overwritten and the file headers/footers are unavailable. 
 
Recovering Hotmail artefacts is an area that needs to be researched further. As 
mentioned in Section 5.0, the specification for Hotmail URLs is yet to be 
determined (these may give a better understanding of the artefacts and may 
establish links between recipients). In addition, artefacts from other integrated 
features of Hotmail are yet to be identified and interpreted.  
 
Artefacts from Hotmail on other web browsers and operating systems also requires 
further research although a similar study was conducted by Eleutério [16]. 
Nevertheless, this paper has shown that there is the potential to build social 
networks using URLs from places.sqlite and user contact information from 
formhistory.sqlite. 
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